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COMMENT
RESTITUTION IN CONTEXT
STEWART MACAULAY t
In preparing, upon our request, a book review of Wade, Cases and Materials
on Restitution,* Professor Macaulay was led to inquire whether restitution
-normally taught in law school as available relief against unjust enrichment--
lends itself as an appropriate unit of study. The stimulating analysis that
followed merits inclusion in the Articles section. After acknowledging ad-
vantages which accrue from the traditional course content, the author poses
the problems which arise from the isolation of restitution into purely doctrinal
organization. In the light of his conclusions, the casebook is appraised.
Dean Wade's new casebook on restitution prompts reflection on
whether the field is an appropriate unit of study.' Why pull together
from all the comers of the law the concept of unjust enrichment rather
than, say, all the remedies for conversion, fraud, mistake, breach of
contract and the like? What is gained by isolating unjust enrichment
for special attention? What are the problems created by such an
isolation? And, finally, how well does Dean Wade's casebook maxi-
mize whatever gains there may be, while minimizing the losses?
RESTITUTION AS A UNIT OF STUDY
1. The Case for Isolating Unjust Enrichment
Restitution is the study of unjust enrichment.2 This involves
two major questions: When is enrichment unjust? What are the
remedies which can be used to take away enrichment deemed unjust
and to restore the economic balance? Needless to say, study organized
around these ideas is not without utility. Such an organization em-
phasizes rules not considered elsewhere in any detail. Moreover, these
rules are significant. Restitution provides much of the legal protection
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School. A.B.,
1952, LL.B., 1954, Stanford University.
* CASES AND MATERIALS Ox RESTITUTION. By Jo HN W. WADE. Brooklyn:
Foundation Press, 1958. Pp. xxxi, 903. $11.00.
1. "Law professors are as far from agreement on . . . [the proper scope and
treatment of the whole subject of restitution] . . . as they ever were." Dawson,
Book Review, 38 CORNELL L.Q. 634, 635 (1953). Cf. Keeton, Book Review, 37
TEXAS L. Rav. 365 (1959).
2. Of course, this is only substantially true. For a definition of restitution see
York, Book Review, 11 J. LEGAL ED. 425, 426-27 (1959).
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of freedom ,to make gifts and bargains, and restitution is also a useful
tool in the legal salvage operation which attempts to clean up the mess
left when a transaction collapses or stealing is discovered. Clients
often want to get out of transactions or to get back their property or its
value. There are rewards for the attorney with ingenuity who ap-
preciates what can be done by waiving a tort, seeking a constructive
trust or asking for the market value, rather than the contract rate, of
a performance rendered by his client before a contract was breached.
Yet these arguments indicate only that restitution should not be
ignored. Why study unjust enrichment as a unit rather than merely
parceling out its material to torts, contracts, property and other some-
what functional areas? At a minimum one can defend restitution as
a unit simply because this organization pulls together some of the
most baffling and interesting problems in the cases. Moreover, study
of restitution as a unit aids in understanding each of the rules and
remedies thereby brought together. Restitution's concepts are difficult
and hardly understood from only a case or a note in a contracts, sales
or similar casebook or treatise. These concepts are related. Ideas
from one body of restitution material will influence the development of
another body of that material. For example, it is difficult to understand
fully the restitutionary -remedies for misrepresentation without seeing
the development of tracing proceeds in the trust and conversion cases.
Moreover, a separate course in which equitable restitutionary remedies
are combined with quasi-contract in an attempt to obtain a com-
prehensive view of the subject "permits at least a comparative study
of restitutionary remedies themselves, of the kind any lawyer must
make when searching out workable solutions." 3
Finally, but perhaps not as obviously, the material found in any
casebook on restitution presents many of the favorite problems of
realistic jurisprudence insofar as that brand of legal -thought centers
upon the tension between decision based on rule and decision based on
reaction to individual cases.4 Restitution is an unusually flexible body
of case law; its rules leave a great deal of give-and-play enabling judges
and juries to consider many cases on their merits unhampered by
doctrine.5 One is tempted to draw an analogy to administrative law.
3. Dawson, supra note 1.
4. "[T]he subject of Restitution . . . is a truly superlative collection of juris-
prudential loose ends." Mechem, Book Review, 25 IowA L. Rxv. 187, 189 (1939).
5. "Since transactions involving large amounts of money are ordinarily well
planned, it is not surprising to find that the amounts involved in quasi contract liti-
gation are usually small. In a system of law which relies on appeal to courts of last
resort to get its rules settled, rules which involve ordinarily only small amounts are
likely to remain unsettled." Patterson, The Scope of Restitution and Unjust Enrich-
inent, 1 Mo. L. REv. 223, 233 (1936).
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In some ways restitution's flexibility can be looked upon as a case law
equivalent to an administrator's power to base decision on unexplained
expertiseY As Professor Dawson has stated, "the most obvious com-
ment about the American law of restitution is that it lacks any kind of
system." 1 Arguably, one of the major points of emphasis in studying
restitution ought to be the virtues and drawbacks of judicial discretion.
The history of restitution is one of innovation and relative free-
dom to decide cases unburdened by formal rules. At an early date the
"tort" action of assumpsit was stretched to encompass not only the
enforcement of promises actually made but also promises which the
law implied in order to reach desired results. But it remained for
Lord Mansfield in 1760 to open the door to discretion by explaining
the basis for this quasi-contractual remedy as an obligation to make
restitution when "natural justice" and "equity" commanded.'
Many judges seem to adopt a free and easy manner in applying
restitution's remedies once they have made a decision to give relief of
some type. One senses an impatience with the accounting details in-
volved in restoring the status quo. For example, in Moritz v. Hors-
inan9 the court found that the heirs could get restitution from an
adopted son of the deceased who had received a share of the estate by
mistake. However, the adopted son had spent some of the money.
Without more than the vaguest possible evidence of what had happened
to the money or how much remained, the court pulled numbers out of
the air to limit the amount the heirs could recover.
Freedom to decide on the basis of a "sense of justice" often is
provided by the nature of restitution's rules. Many of the doctrines
are clear enough when applied to typical cases but lack precision at
the boundaries when applied to situations other than the typical one.
Many rules turn on questions of knowledge, motive and intent, thus
giving the trier of fact some leeway in doubtful situations. Some
restitution concepts can be expanded or contracted to yield particular
results; witness the accordion-like term "benefit" which, without
further explanation, can both include and exclude losses in reliance
on a contract which do not add to the assets of the defendant. Rule
and counter-rule exist with little in their statement to tell one when to
use the rule and when to use the counter-rule. For example, relief is
not given for unilateral mistake (too often), yet relief is given if one
party should have known of the other's error. But when should he have
6. See generally Auerbach, Should Administrative Agencies Perform Adjudica-
tory Functions, 1959 Wis. L. REv. 95, 100-08.
7. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 111 (1951).
8. Moses v. Macferlan, Burr. 1005, 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (K.B. 1760).
9. 305 Mich. 627, 9 N.W.2d 868 (1943).
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known? Fictions also serve, although not too artfully, to conceal the
reasons for decision in a magical fashion; one thinks of the beautifully
logical arguments developed from the premise that a "rescinded" con-
tract ceases to exist and vanishes without a trace. Of course, it follows
that once the rescinded contract "ceases to exist" recovery of the fair
market value of a part performance rendered before breach "cannot
possibly" be limited -to the contract rate.
The study of restitution can involve considering how far this
flexibility and discretion are desirable. Undoubtedly, the power to
deal with each case on its facts is valuable insofar as judges and juries
ought to be the agencies through which society works out sensible
solutions to all the problems created by the wide variety of human
transactions. Reaching the best possible answer in each case to
questions such as when to let people out of bargains or overturn other
transactions for fraud, duress, mistake or breach of fiduciary duty
requires fine line drawing and great attention to individual differences.
One can doubt whether legislators or judges framing common law rules
could crystallize wise solutions for all cases drawing these lines and
respecting the differences. Even the oldest restitution problems are not
all solved in a satisfactory way, and restitution cases constantly raise
new problems where experience is limited. The judge or jury faced
with the particular case may be able to come out with a sensible
decision without being able to generalize a rule for broader classes of
cases.
It is a familiar story that flexibility and discretion have draw-
backs. One ideal is that an individual can "foresee the action of the
state and make use of this knowledge as a datum in forming his own
plans. . . . " ' Insofar as legal response is flexible it is less fore-
seeable. But how much certainty is needed? Professor Gardner has
stated that, "the certainties which parties chiefly desire in making con-
tracts are the certainty that promised cooperation in their enterprises
will be forthcoming, that their labor will not be forced into unproductive
channels, and that they will receive and retain the economic values
which their efforts may produce."" Despite the flexibility which has
been described, restitution is not an uncharted sea; much is settled.
Most transactions are hard to overturn in the typical situation. We
are not, for example, yet to the point where a bargainer can back out
of a deal merely because he made a mistake in predicting a normal
increase in the market price of the basic raw material needed for his
10. HAYEx, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 81 (1944).
11. Gardner, An Inquiry Into the Principles of the Law of Contracts, 46 HAv.
L. REv. 1, 40 (1932).
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performance of a contract. What we have is, rather, a number of
areas marked off within which discretion can operate. 2 Discretion
can be, and often is, exercised to achieve the values stated by Professor
Gardner. Then, too, to a great degree one can plan so as to avoid
these areas of discretion. For example, form contracts often seek to
avoid the effect of salesmen's representations not contained in the
written document. Even within the areas of discretion, case law
practice is to crystallize repeated judgments into rules as more and
more instances come before the courts. Perhaps there is more reason
to worry that rigidity has set in too quickly in some areas before
sensible judgments have been worked out.
Yet even if the degree of flexibility in restitution doctrine has
sufficient utility to outweigh its cost in certainty, students ought to
recognize that discretionary action can be arbitrary action. Perhaps
arbitrary or irrational decision is encouraged by the fact that restitution,
somewhat like criminal law, stresses the Tight and wrong nature of
conduct. The wilful defaulter, the fraudulent bargainer, the officious
intermeddler, and the negligent actor are all villains in restitution's
cast of characters. At times the desire to punish wrongdoing can get
in the way of sensible judgment.'- It is easy, for example, to be blinded
to the claims of innocent third parties by a desire to punish the wrong-
ful defendant. It is easy, for example, to obscure the difficult policy
questions raised by restitution to a plaintiff in default on a contract by
finding such a plaintiff a wrongdoer to be punished. This is not to
deny that society ought to deal with wrongful conduct, but students
ought to be aware that moral judgments are not easy to make under
the limitations of an adversary system, especially when we are not clear
as to the moral assumptions of economic transactions. Arbitrary
decision may also be fostered by the fact that questions such as the
proper allocation of risk, the permissible degree of coercion in bargain-
ing, and the desirability of preferring the claim of one creditor to that
of another are business or economic questions not easy to answer. One
can ask whether judges, lawyers and jurors can make these moral and
economic judgments demanded by restitution theory with any degree of
skill. How far can or should attorneys introduce evidence relevant to
these moral and economic issues? Or does restitution theory really
contemplate the application of rational norms based on moral or eco-
nomic theories? Is what we seek, rather, a community reaction to the
individual case as expressed by a judge's or jury's "sense of justice"?
12. Cf. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISm 122, 123 (1924).
13. Cf. Sharp, The Limits of Law, 61 ETHIcs 270, 279, 280 (1951).
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The questions are easy to ask.14 Many would say that they ought to be
asked in any study of materials on restitution. Moreover, the existence
of these questions may itself justify pulling together these materials for
study.
2. The Problems Created by Isolation
While there are reasons to isolate restitution for study, this
isolation may present some serious, but perhaps not insoluble, problems.
A "pure" doctrinal organization, that is, one excluding everything but
cases on unjust enrichment, would take restitution ideas out of context
-with inevitable loss of understanding. 5  Since restitution is part of
the legal framework for diverse economic activity the problem of con-
text is aggravated. One considers, for example, certain aspects of
family and related non-commercial transactions such as services
rendered by one family member or neighbor to another, or allocations
of wealth by one family member to another through gifts, trusts or
wills. Restitution remedies protect, to some degree, the use and
exchange value of property in both commercial and non-commercial
dealings. One's reliance on others to do his business is facilitated some-
what by constructive trust devices which take away the fruits of
wrongdoing committed while acting in a representative capacity.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, restitution concepts and reme-
dies are part of the legal framework for bargaining transactions. A
"pure theory" of restitution considers only part of the legal system
relevant to a given probem and also tends to overlook what restitution
shows about the relationship of the legal order to certain social institu-
tions and values.
(a) Restitution and Complementary and Conflicting Rules of Law
Focusing attention on restitution blurs the total picture of the
legal system. Restitution itself is an advance over the older organiza-
tion around quasi-contract because "a treatment of these remedies
[constructive trust, equitable lien, subrogation and decrees of rescis-
sion or reformation as well as quasi-contract] . . . demonstrates to
the -student how the ingenuity of the practicing attorney may make the
difference between a barren legal right and complete and adequate
relief." " Yet restitution alone presents only part, and often only a
small part, of the legal rights and remedies involved in a transaction.Y7
14. On these questions see generally WE, LAw IN ECoNOMY AND Socimv 74,
201-03, 228, 230 (Rheinstein ed. 1954).
15. Dawson, supra note 1.
16. Wade, Book Review, 5 J. LEGAL ED. 242, 243 (1952).
17. Cf. KEroN, FAuD AND MISTAKE (1954); WIGHT, CASES oN Rz)EDIES
(1955).
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An attorney seeking complete and adequate relief often must choose
between restitution and full compensation for loss; benefits conferred
and losses caused are theories of recovery which -may produce awards
of very different amounts. Furthermore, often it is difficult to under-
stand a particular rule of restitution without fitting it into the context
of all legal and equitable relief available on similar facts. This is par-
ticularly true if the restitution rule has been developed to fill gaps in
contract, tort or property notions. For example, rescission and
reformation for fraud, innocent misrepresentation and certain mistakes
are restitution's contributions to protecting a bargainer from the con-
sequences of dealing without the knowledge needed for choice, risk
assumption and prediction. But on the same facts an attorney often
would be able to use also the tort of deceit and the remedies for breach
of warranty. He would be compelled to consider their use where the
plaintiff's loss (e.g., consequential damages) far exceeds the defendant's
gain. Furthermore, modern printed form contracts often contain
clauses disclaiming responsibility for warranties and representations not
stated on the face of the document. Suppose a -salesman makes an oral
warranty, and the customer signs the contract without reading it. Can
the customer get some or all of the benefits of the warranty? This may
involve the restitutionary remedies of rescission or reformation for
fraud or mistake, but it may also involve to an equal degree the parol
evidence rule and the Statute of Frauds. Finally, the lack of develop-
ment in certain restitution doctrines may be explained by the fact that
the same problem traditionally is handled by other rules; the contract
requirement of consideration, for example, serves to overturn some
bargains resulting from undue coercion. This may be one reason why
the restitution theory of business compulsion or economic duress re-
mains to be worked out fully."8
(b) Restitution, Social Institutions and Values
Concentration on restitution cases -runs -the danger of overlooking
the relationship of this part of the legal system to certain social
institutions and values. If restitution's rules and remedies are to be
understood tfully, they must, like any other body of rules and remedies,
be related to the policies they carry out or attempt to carry out.
Restitution doctrines reflect both the urge to take away gains made
at the expense of another and certain ethical and economic assumptions
related to the type of transaction which produced the gain which one
party calls unjust.
18. KFSSLER & SHARP, CASES ON CoNTRACrS 294-97 (1953) ; Sharp, Pacta Sunt
Servaiud, 41 COLum. L. REv. 783 (1941).
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The most apparent, and perhaps the most discussed, policy under-
lying restitution is -the urge to take away gains made at the expense of
another.19 This idea carries restitution into -the legal framework of
almost every type of economic activity. Yet as Professor Dawson has
warned:
"From the record it appears that a general principle prohibiting
enrichment through another's loss appears first as a convenient
explanation of specific results; it is an instrument for quite
practical and intelligible purposes. Yet once the idea has been
formulated as a generalization, it has -the peculiar faculty of in-
ducing quite sober citizens to jump right off the dock . . . It
constantly tends to become a 'rule,' to dictate solutions, to impose
itself on the mind." o
This general principle of corrective justice aimed against "free
rides" should be, and usually is, subject to the claims of other general
principles. For example, a land owner who loves the architecture of
Frank Lloyd Wright returns from a trip and finds that another, under
the mistaken impression that he owned the land, has built a pink
colonial-ranch-style house. The land owner is asked to pay for the
"gain" he has received from the mistaken improver's loss. Should
the owner pay for the house or should his freedom of choice be
protected ?
These clashes of policies are usually resolved verbally by saying
that gains made at the expense of another need not be given back
unless the gains were unjust. But it is hard to classify enrichment as
"unjust" without considering what you mean, under the circumstances
of -the case before you, by the term "just." And a rational definition
of justice will turn on certain ethical and economic assumptions related
to the transaction which produced the gain. Without -this policy con-
text any restitution rule will be most difficult to understand and
evaluate. A sketch of the impact of some of the policy considerations
of commercial bargaining on restitution may help point up the influence
of context on decision.
At least three not totally consistent themes about the relationship
of law and economic activity run through the legal framework for
bargaining and are reflected to a significant degree by restitution.
One idea is that law should play as little part as possible in order to
encourage self-reliance. Another is that law should provide a frame-
work for and protect the chance to make rational plans, and that the
19. See, e.g., DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT (1951); Jackson, The Restatenent
of Restitution, 10 Miss. LJ. 95 (1938) ; Patterson, supra note 5.
20. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRicHMENT 8 (1951).
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law should see that these plans can be carried out. Finally, commercial
law, to some extent, reflects the idea that people ought to be let out
of bad bargains or ought to have heavy losses shifted from their
shoulders.
(1) Most restitutionary ideas at first glance seem inconsistant
with the policy that the law ought to keep hands off bargaining in
order to encourage self-reliance. Those who have entered contracts
because of duress, fraud or mistake seek restitution because in the
particular case they were not able to take care of themselves. Yet the
caveat emptor (or caveat vendor or caveat insurer) notion undoubtedly
serves as a brake on sweeping relief, and most bargainers who want
to back out of a deal find the opportunities provided by restitution
decidedly limited: One cannot rely on some statements, no matter how
gross the misrepresentation, and get out of the deal at the time the fraud
is discovered. 2 One cannot apply his signature on the dotted line
without reading the contract and expect much sympathy. The idea
can be, and has been, carried too far. Some judicial opinions do
reflect a notion of commerce as "the wandering peddler, the horse-trader,
the side-show at the fair . . . arms-length bargaining, single occa-
sion deals, and the devil take the fool." 2 However, a relatively free
market system does work better if bargainers will take care of them-
selves; obviously a system based on rational conduct will work better
if people will behave rationally.' To some extent self-reliance cuts
costs. The pricing of goods and services may reflect the risk of liability
for representations if that risk is imposed. There is also the cost of
more social machinery to deal with bargaining if people will not protect
themselves and instead look to courts to take care of them in all of their
transactions. More of this kind of machinery may mean more regula-
tion of bargaining which, in turn, may mean a limitation on the
number of choices available to bargainers and consumers. The legal
system's refusal to adjust many disputes over alleged misrepresentation
21. E.g., some cases hold that one may not rely on statements the facts of which
are open to ordinary observation. Kaiser v. Nummerdor, 120 Wis. 234, 97 N.W.
932 (1904). Also, it is generally held that a buyer has no right to rely upon dealers'
talk ("puffing"). Vulcan Metals Co. v. Simmons Mfg. Co., 248 Fed. 853 (2d Cir.
1918).
22. Llewellyn, On Warraty of Quality, and Soeiety, 36 CoLum. L. REv. 699,
713 (1936).
23. The question remains as to what the legal system should do if individuals
cannot or will not behave rationally. Cf.: "A pathetic spectacle is the show of zeal
the husband will affect when reading a sales contract; it wouldn't make the slightest
difference what outrageous provisions were inserted, he will still read on, compre-
hending nothing. Among young people there seems to be a strong faith that the
protective legislation of the last twenty years, such as the small-loan acts, has some-
how reversed the law of caveat emptor." WHYTE, THE ORGANIZATION MAN 359
(Anchor ed. 1956).
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or economic duress may tend to encourage settlement and adjustment
through other means. The parties themselves, -if forced to handle the
matter, often can work out a better solution to a dispute than could be
given by judges and juries not expert in the details of -the transaction
which caused the trouble. On the other hand, an adjustment more
desirable than case by case relief may come through association of
individuals for the purpose of obtaining bargaining or political power.
(2) The second and probably the dominant theme of bargaining
is that -the legal system -should facilitate rational planning for profit and
protect against losses caused by reliance on such plans when expecta-
tions are not realized. 4 Rational planning is at best exceedingly
difficult; ideally it requires a precise knowledge 6f the wants and
desires to be achieved, and it requires an accurate prediction of what
course of action will achieve these goals. Accurate prediction, in turn,
requires a knowledge of -the properties of goods and services and their
power to satisfy wants. Planning for profit requires, in addition, a
knowledge of the exchange opportunities which are open and an
ability to bargain relatively free from coercion. 5 The difficulties are
magnified in some -types of transactions where it is necessary, or where
it is the practice, to make these decisions quickly and on incomplete
knowledge. The legal system can make rational planning easier by
minimizing these difficulties in making free and informed choices.
They will be minimized if transactions resulting from undue coercion
are overturned. They will be minimized also if bargainers can deal on
the basis of representations without painstaking investigation, and if
bargainers are not held to contracts resulting from mistakes unless
one bargainer has misled the other carelessly or has assumed the
risk of loss caused by lack of knowledge or an incorrect prediction of
the future. Rational planning for profit also is made easier if one can
rely on a bargain once made. It must be noted that in facilitating
rational bargaining, judges and jurors must work with a polarity of
values."6 Often, for example, a decision requires judgment as ,to the
relative strength of the "pull" of responsibility only for free and
24. "[T]he notion of unjust enrichment includes the most significant common law
and equitable limitations on freedom of contract." Address by Malcolm P. Sharp,
Thirty-fifth Meeting of Association of American Law Schools, December 29, 1937,
in 8 AM. L.S. REv. 1044, 1046 (1938). It is sometimes necessary to limit free con-
tract to promote free and rational planning. See KESSLER & SHARP, op. cit. supra
note 18, at 1-9, 249-311, 344-72.
25. On the presuppositions of rational planning see, Knight, The Ethics of Com-
petition, in THE ETHICS OF COMPETITION AND OTHER ESSAYS 19, 49-58 (1935). See
also COMMONS, INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 331-39 (1959) ; Taylor, Economic Theory
and Certain Non-Economic Elements in Social Life, in EcoNoMICS AND LIBERALISm
116, 124-28 (1955).
26. See COHEN, A PREFACE TO LOGIC 86-89 (Meridian ed. 1956).
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intelligent choice and some competing value such as protection of re-
liance or change of position by others affected by the transaction."
Much of the law of restitution emphasizes the ideal of free
bargaining and seeks to facilitate it. One ought to have the chance
to make a choice between alternatives relatively free from coercion;
restitution responds, perhaps a little weakly, with the volunteer, duress
and the still developing business compulsion doctrines. One ought to
have -the information and knowledge needed for choice, risk assumption
and prediction: restitution's remedies for misrepresentation and mis-
take afford some relief when information and knowledge are lacking or
where there has been reliance on an erroneous assumption. One's choice
ought to be properly recorded if it is reduced to writing: reformation
of instruments corrects some errors. Finally, one ought to be able to
rely, to perform and receive return performance from the other party:
restitutionary remedies serve to return performances given by mistake
or because of trick. Likewise, they serve to return some part perform-
ances (or their "value") given before breach by either the aggrieved or
the defaulting party.
Compromises with the ideal of free and intelligent choice are
required to reflect the "pull" of other values. In many transactions
one must be able to rely on appearances. A bargainer who carelessly
misleads another often destroys a whole chain of plans. Moreover,
choice must be proved in litigation by appearances or self-serving
statements. As a result courts sometimes apply an objective theory
of contract, treating one who looks like he has made a choice as if he
had."8 This consideration, perhaps too often, limits relief for mistake.29
Similar thoughts about reliance on appearances have prompted some
courts to hold one for his negligent or even innocent misrepresentations
in bargaining. Rational bargaining is also facilitated by standard
allocations of risk in certain common or important transactions. One
can then bargain about the important question of price without bother-
ing about other things. For example, relief for mistake is seldom given
in bargains for sales of securities. One who takes or gives a warranty
or quitclaim deed has accepted certain standardized risks.
Other compromises are dictated by the fact that as time goes on it
becomes harder to back up a bargain and adjust the economic balance in
27. Of course, the three categories suggested in fact overlap to some degree. A
decision holding one to a bargain may be based on both self-reliance and rational
planning policies; a decision upsetting a bargain may be based on both the rational
planning and sympathy themes.
28. See HuRsT, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM 14, 22 (1956); Sharp,
Promissory Liability, 7 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 4-5 (1939).
29. Compare Patterson, Equitable Relief for Unilateral Mistake, 28 CoLVin. L.
REv. 859 (1928), with Sharp, Williston on Contracts, 4 U. Cur. L. REv. 30, 31-39
(1936).
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a sensible manner. 0 "We must get on. We cannot be forever reopen-
ing." "' Much restitution dootrine reflects the possibility that reliance,
new expectations or third party interests can outweigh the value of
protecting choice. Relief can be refused, although otherwise warranted,
for laches, inability to restore the defendant to -the status quo, affirmance
of the transaction by the complaining party, change of position by one
who has received a benefit conferred by mistake, waiver or the interven-
ing rights of third parties.
(3) Both of -the themes sketched, self-reliance and protection for
rational planning, require losses to be taken when risks have been
assumed.3 2 The difference is largely in the definition of the risks of a
bargain. The self-reliance policy tends to place all risks on the bar-
gainers: one who has promised should perform and not make excuses.
A system seeking to protect rational bargaining as far as possible must
make more precise distinctions as to what risks were assumed or what
risks ought to be imposed. In contrast, the third theme running through
commercial law opposes the demand of both of the other themes for
responsibility for choice. This theme, which usually operates as a very
quiet counterpoint to the others, lets people out of bad bargains. It is
based on ethical ideals of our society, and psychological urges, about
pressing an advantage too far and making undue profit. It reflects
ideals about helping someone in need when it is not "fair" to hold him
to his promise.33 Few judicial opinions are openly based on this policy
30. "The transaction is two or more wills giving, taking, persuading, coercing,
defrauding, commanding, obeying, competing, governing, in a world of scarcity,
mechanism, and rules of conduct. The court deals with will-in-action. Like the
modern physicist or chemist, its ultimate unit is not an atom but an electron, always
in motion-not an individual but two or more individuals in action. It never catches
them except in motion. Their motion is a transaction. A transaction occurs at a
point in time. But transactions flow into another over a period of time. . .
CoiMMONs, op. cit. supra note 12, at 7-8.
31. Llewellyn, What Price Cmtract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J.
704, 735 (1931).
32. "[I]f the individual is to be free to choose, it is inevitable that he should bear
the risk attaching to that choice and that in consequence he be rewarded, not accord-
ing to the goodness or badness of his intentions, but solely on the basis of the value
of results to others. We must face the fact that the preservation of individual free-
dom is incompatible with a full satisfaction of our views of distributive justice." HAYEK,
individualism: True and False, in INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 1, 21-22
(1948).
33. "The market community as such is the most impersonal relationship of
practical life into which humans can enter with one another. . . . Where the market
is allowed to follow its own autonomous tendencies, its participants do not look
toward the persons of each other but only toward the commodity; there are ito
obligatious of brotherliiwss. . . . The partner to a transaction is expected to behave
according to rational legality and, quite particularly, to respect the formal inviolability
of a promise once given. These are the qualities which form the content of market
ethics." WEBER, op. cit. supra note 14, at 192. (Emphasis added.) See also id. at
308-09; GERTH & MILLS, FROM MAX WEBER 312-13 (Galaxy ed. 1958) ; WEBER, THE
PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (Parsons transl. 1958). Obvi-
ously, our society is not totally committed to what Weber calls market ethics. Cf.
SELEKMAN, POWER AND MORALITY IN A BUSINESS SOCIETY 90-92 (1956); SHARP
& Fox, BUSINESS ETHICS 11 (1937).
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of sympathy, although this may be what is meant when a court talks
About justice without defining the term. Yet responsibility for a poor
choice can be undercut through the discretion given to judges and
juries by the nature of many of restitution's rules which let people out
of bad bargains. Risk taking has great economic importance, but not
all men are professional risk takers or want to take risks 4 For
example, there may be a disparity between the bargaining skill and
the eagerness to take chances of an insurance adjuster and an injured
factory worker. The relative instability of insurance releases may be
explained, although not necessarily justified, by widely held reactions
against pressing an advantage too far, especially against one whose
risk assumption was not too skillful or willing to begin with?' Of
course, the relative frequency with which these releases are overturned
may reflect nothing more than an attempt by judge or jury to redis-
tribute wealth. The third theme, in addition to tempering responsibility
for choice, also imposes responsibility where there has been no choice
or fault. Welfare may be promoted if the party best able to spread
losses is saddled with risks not assumed in fact. Arguably, this con-
sideration is present in restitutionary thinking, although it is not
emphasized.
Enrichment resulting from a bargaining transaction will be just
or unjust depending on a judge's or juror's judgment as to the proper
emphasis to give these overlapping themes and sub-themes. The
problem is usually one of proportion." The conclusion reached often
will be influenced by the type of transaction involved. Rules of restitu-
tion are applied differently in cases involving, for example, sales of
goods, sales of land, building contracts and service contracts. Some of
this is due to history and accident and makes no sense. Yet differential
treatment sometimes can be explained in terms of the themes and sub-
themes discussed, since the need for speed and reliance on appearances,
the chance to investigate with care, the skill of typical bargainers, and
the consequences of placing the full loss on one party will differ sig-
nificantly from one type of transaction to another. The legal system
ought to respond, also, to the differing efficiency of the non-legal
sanctions in various types of transactions. In some areas the desire
for good-will undoubtedly is more important in policing business con-
duct than legal rules about fraud, warranty and mistake. Yet else-
34. Cf. Comx.ors, op. cit. supra note 12, at 306; GALBRAiTu, THE AFFLULNT
Socmry 100-10 (1958) ; Knight, supra note 25, at 63-66.
35. Cf. Doyle v. Teasdale, 263 Wis. 328, 57 N.W2d 381 (1953); DAWSON &
PAxasm, CASES ON REsTrrurnoN 686-88 (1958); Sharp, supra note 18, at 787-88
& n.14.
36. Cf. Knight, Intelligence and Social Policy, 67 ETHics 155, 158 (1957).
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where the non-legal sanctions are weak and need shoring up by the
legal. It is only a slight exaggeration to -say -that the major subject
matter of restitution is sales of houses, lots and farm animals; all situa-
tions where non-legal sanctions are flimsy at best.
These problems of context created by a strict organization based
on restitution alone are not too difficult to solve, provided they are
recognized. Materials can be provided to enable students to see the
full range of legal doctrine brought into play by the basic transactions
with which restitution deals. Attention also should be given to purpose
and policy. Restitution cases themselves establish without too much
trouble that judges have a great deal of discretion but that it is not
unlimited. Yet this is only -the first step in thinking about how law
can help or hinder many kinds of economic activity. One must also
have a picture of the particular social institution involved-gift, bargain,
property and the like-and some appreciation of the values involved in
that institution. This picture can be sketched in restitution casebooks
by text notes or excerpts from appropriate non-legal materials which
point up both the factual setting for the transaction and the values
involved. Of course, an editor always could take the radical step of
arranging the cases and materials around these institutions and values.
WADE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON RESTITUTION
Dean Wade's casebook maximizes the gains to be derived from
studying restitution as a unit and minimizes the losses fairly well, but
one can raise several questions of emphasis. The book is primarily
concerned with presenting settled general rules in a logical order. This
is not to say that other aspects are ignored, but only to state an impres-
sion that they are very much subordinated. The casebook does not
attempt much by way of fitting restitution into its total legal setting.
The material on rescission for fraud only mentions the tort of deceit in
a few scattered sentences, and if implied warranties are touched on, I
overlooked it. The material on reformation is not fitted into the
complementary and conflicting parol evidence -rule ideas. The material
on economic duress does not consider the degree to which the law
handles the same problem by the consideration doctrine in contracts.
Of course, one might assume that students will do the job of relating
this material to what is studied in other courses. Yet the task of
relating restitution to other subjects is not an easy one.
The casebook provides some of the policy context in which
restitution operates, but not as much as I would like. Policy con-
siderations are sometimes presented in the judicial opinions re-
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produced. For example, Judge Frank's concurrence in Ricketts v.
Pennsylvania R.R.3 7 presents one view on the utility of the objective
theory of contract in relation to relief for unilateral mistake, and argues
for more open judicial treatment of economic duress caused by situa-
tions where bargaining power is unequal. However, the casebook does
not print anything taking the opposite position on either of these issues,
such as Professor Sharp's analysis of Judge Frank's comments on in-
equality of bargaining power.3 The notes after the main cases at
times reprint or restate policy arguments relevant to the problem.
For example, Professor Corbin's scornful remarks about denying
restitution to one in "wilful" breach of contract3 9 are set forth (p.
502) and Fuller and Perdue's analysis of the interests protected by any
system of remedies for breach of contract-the expectation, reliance and
restitution interests q--is summarized in one sentence (p. 445). Often
the casebook, without even a one sentence summary, cites law review
articles which do contain useful material on policy issues. For example,
the section on restitution for benefits conferred in performance of a
contract discharged because of impossibility contains no mention of the
many suggestions that loss splitting may be a more sensible solution
than restitution of rather artificial "benefits." A student comment in
the Michigan Law Review 4" which does present these ideas is cited (p.
551).
Arguably, policy material ought not be included; lawyers ought to
stick to their last (to mix a metaphor). This material is difficult, it
provides no clear cut answers, and perhaps law students and law
teachers do not have the background to handle it.4" Yet if decisions
turn on risk assumption,' how can lawyers discuss these decisions
37. 153 F2d 757, 760-70 (2d Cir. 1946).
38. Sharp, Promises, Mistake, and Reciprocity, 19 U. CHL. L. R v. 286, 294-96
(1952).
39. 5 CoRBN, CONTRACtS § 1123 (1951).
40. Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Dantages, 46 YALE L.J.
52, 373 (1936).
41. Comment, 46 MIcH. L. REv. 401 (1948). It is interesting to note that, in
the casebool, loss splitting is offered as the solution to another problem. WADE,
CASES ON RESTITUTION 682 (1958).
42. "The volume [PATTERSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRAcrs II (1935)]
begins with several long opinions on the inferences with respect to sanity to be drawn
from specific evidence, and ends with several extracts from psychiatrists. While
these are no doubt instructive reading, one wonders how much is to be learned by a
classroom discussion of them between teachers who are not psychiatrists and students
who have no means or intention of becoming such.... Discussion might be centered
on the really doctrinal decisions, leaving the others to be read." Gardner, Book Re-
view, 45 YALE L.J. 1153, 1154 (1936).
43. "Assumption of Risk" is a major heading in the index to the casebook.
WADE, op. cit. supra note 41, at 899.
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without some understanding of the conflicting economic ideas about
risk? How can lawyers consider restitution for a plaintiff in default
on a contract without some understanding of the not always consistent
ethical ideas about breaking promises? Ethical and economic assump-
tions are a necessary part of the course; the question is whether or not
to examine them openly as distinguished from talking about the fairness
or justice of a result without defining what one means by fair or just
in the particular case." A great deal of material on these issues is
not required. Much can be accomplished by questions designed to
point out the policy assumptions of the main cases, some well written
text, and an organization which allows some development of ethical
and economic assumptions.'
Placing these criticisms to one side, Wade, Cases and Materials on
Restitution is a good casebook. The opinions reprinted are well
selected to prompt discussion. One who studies these materials ought
to know the general outlines of what the courts have done. He should
also see some of the degree of flexibility left by the rules in certain
situations and the rigid, set, and not necessarily intelligible answers
found in other places. He should have an appreciation of the im-
portance of history in molding the treatment of unjust enrichment and
the variety of overlapping restitution remedies left to us by that history.
The organization of the casebook is easy to see, which aids study and
enables other teachers to adapt the book to their tastes or curriculum
needs. The book is rich in citations to law review materials and has
a most useful bibliography.
44. Cf. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AmEcAN LAW 265-66 (1950).
45. Cf. FULLER, BASIC CONTRACT LAW (1947); DAWSON & HARVEY, CASES ON
CONTRACTS AND CONTRACT REMIEs (1958); KESSLER & SHARP, op. cit. supra
note 18.
